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DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, IO A/S  
SILVERBERG, NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY

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SUBJECT: UN DPKO GUEHENNO: BASHIR HAS NOT MADE A STRATEGIC  
SHIFT

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Bolton for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

11. (C) SUMMARY: Presidential Special Envoy for the Sudan Andrew Natsios met with UN DPKO U/SYG Jean Marie Guehenno on December 4 to discuss next steps for Darfur. Guehenno stated that Sudanese President Bashir has still not made a "strategic shift" in his position that would allow for the three-phased deployment plan outline in the Addis Ababa consensus agreement. Natsios agreed with Guehenno's assessment, adding that if such a shift does not happen by January 1, the USG is poised to take a dramatically different approach with the Government of Sudan (GOS). END SUMMARY.

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Guehenno: Bashir Has Not  
Made a Strategic Shift  
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12. (C) Guehenno opened the meeting with a readout of his discussion with Sudanese officials at the margins of the November 30 AU PSC meeting in Abuja saying that he had pushed the GOS to accept all aspects of the Addis Ababa consensus agreement and emphasized the practical necessities of UN involvement. The Sudanese had responded by accepting all three phases of the deployment plan in principle with some qualifications. In regard to force size, the Sudanese had indicated privately a willingness to accept a force size of 17,300.

13. (C) Guehenno noted, however, that the GOS commitments at Abuja conflicted with President Bashir's public statements and November 29 correspondence with SYG Annan rejecting a AU-UN hybrid force. In regard to phase 1 of Addis Ababa consensus (the UN light support package for AMIS), the GOS is still preventing UN personnel from deploying to Darfur over a "disagreement over what color berets they will wear" despite public commitments to facilitate the assistance. Guehenno concluded that President Bashir has not yet made a "strategic shift" in his thinking. Natsios said that President Bashir's behavior is most consistent with a strategy of delay.

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AMIS Commander is  
the "Enemy"  
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14. (C) Natsios queried whether AMIS Commander General Aprezi is responsible for delaying UN assistance to AMIS. Guehenno confirmed that Aprezi had declined to accept UN assistance or offer alternative ideas for improving AMIS performance. Guehenno quipped, "Aprezi is the enemy. It is clear he will not get us anywhere." Guehenno reported that Nigerian President Obasanjo promised to replace Aprezi with a "better commander" before phase 3 of the Addis Ababa deployment plan.

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Pressure DPA  
Non-Signatories Too  
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¶15. (C) Guehenno commented that diplomatic pressure on the GOS needed to be complemented with equal pressure on the DPA non-signatory rebel groups. The international community has so far focused too much on the GOS, but the non-signatories are "also part of the problem." Natsios concurred, adding that a cease-fire and a revitalized political process were essential components of any settlement.

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The Way Forward  
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¶16. (C) Guehenno provided some details on DPKO progress with phases 1 and 2 of the Addis Ababa deployment plan (light and heavy assistance packages for AMIS). A DPKO team is now in Addis Ababa to work out details of the heavy support package with the AU. DPKO now has plans for almost 3000 personnel to go in to Darfur: 1220 military, 750 police and 1000 civilians. If and when the GOS agrees to a hybrid force of some 17,000 troops, Guehenno observed that there is "no way" that DPKO could put together a purely African force of such numbers. The UN will need non-AU support, i.e. an Indian or Pakistani brigade and associated enablers.

¶17. (C) Natsios said he planned to visit Khartoum very soon, hopefully within a matter of days. He explained that for the US, next steps entailed one last attempt to get Bashir to go

USUN NEW Y 00002232 002 OF 002

along with the Addis Ababa consensus. If Bashir remained defiant, the US is prepared to shift to a series of sticks after January 1. The US preferred not to go this route but saw little alternative since President Bashir appeared intent on continuing his destructive path.

¶18. (U) SE Andrew Natsios' staff cleared this message.

BOLTON